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Does the Anthropocene Require Us To Be Saints? 
 
 
 In the spirit of this workshop conference, I shall not today advance a thesis or propose 
any answer to my question. You will hear a problem and the reason this problem should 
matter to us. A signal-flare from the cubbyhole of academic theory in which I work will 
accompany the presentation of this problem. For, although I have what I think is an answer 
to the problem, my views come from the domain of philosophy of history. This is a field and 
a discourse that is unknown to most American philosophers. Indeed, it is at best severely 
misunderstood, and by consequence it hardly exists in this country as a professional interest, 
although in fact many philosophers use it or do it all the time. It is, in my view, a subsuming 
field—that is to say, it is a fundamental philosophical inquiry that cuts across all topics in so 
far as they have a diachronic, or roughly “historical,” aspect. In any case, the brevity of our 
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format leaves the presentations short of detail. But the advantage of not arguing an answer is 
that I get to hear your thoughts. This presentation is one of several salients for thinking 
through the place of moral life and thought in human temporality and historicity, including 
that of future history, such as the Anthropocene, and in particular questions about 
personhood in a milieu in which non-human species might have moral claims upon us. I 
hope to launch your further consideration of these matters in your work on the 
Anthropocene and anti-anthropocentrism. 
 When I ask whether the Anthropocene requires us to be saints, I am asking if  any of 
the conditions of this era in which humankind lives, or will soon live, require us to think 
conscientiously about whether human moral agents ought to perform supererogatory acts 
that satisfy moral obligations to others, both human and non-human, that arise in 
Anthropocene circumstances. Supererogatory acts are those acts that one’s understanding of 
moral good does not require her to do but that it does commend her to do as fulfilment of or 
as practical or logical extensions of her morality of right and wrong. We commonly say that 
such acts are “above and beyond the call of duty,” such as throwing one’s self on a bomb in 
order to save the lives of others whom it would have hurt or killed without an obstructing 
intervening act. 
 One of the many oddities of supererogation is that while it is by definition wholly 
voluntary and optional, it is also deontic. The concept relies on some notion of duty that is 
purported to be special and distinct from actual moral obligation in theory, even when in 
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practice those who perform supererogatory acts often say that duty or moral law required 
them to perform these acts; indeed, they rarely give any other reason. If you squint at it, 
supererogation looks like every duty under the moral law of rational freedom in Kant’s 
ethics. There is, so to speak, something passive-aggressive about this concept as usually 
formulated. For us the concept is useful, even if it cannot be saved from incoherence, because 
it expresses the perfectionist structure (or temptation) in any deontic moral philosophy. Let 
us settle for saying that the issue for us concerns non-Kantian supererogatory moral ideals, 
claims, or counsels to act toward such ideals. 
 Any anti-anthropocentrism that requires or strongly requires supererogatory behavior 
is what I call rigid, or thorough-going, anti-anthropocentrism. David Roden discusses a 
consideration that I regard as an example of supererogation under rigid dis-
anthropocentrization. Normatively, it is wrong to inhibit the flourishing of other humans. 
Would it not then be wrong for us not to live in such a way as to maximize the flourishing of 
post-human intelligent beings by not preparing the Earth for them or by standing their way 
by any in any manner?1 Note that the question as it stands is limited in application to beings 
of our intelligence or greater intelligence, defined in some way it us not necessary to specify 
here. The same moral principle can be applied to other kinds of current life on Earth when 
                                                 




we ask if it is not a morally correct though supererogatory counsel not to eat meat. Even  
consequentialists urge supererogatory claims for life in the Anthropocene through “effective 
altruism.” The Oxford philosopher Toby Ord is a good example of this: he owns very little, 
lives on a small fraction of his salary, and donates the rest. Perhaps this is not sacrifice 
enough, or perhaps consequentialism mitigates supererogatory claims. 
 It is not possible to verify now what might or might not be required of us in the 
Anthropocene future, invisible over the horizon. The extent of the moral demand to dis-
anthropocentrize is dependent on this future history in its further reaches, so it is likewise 
not possible to see what this shall require of us. Ethical rules, or maxims, usually stand 
between us and the supererogatory. But in the case at hand a highly externalist moral 
situation, made even more lopsided by a fear of extinction that makes reservations about de-
centering ourselves appear to be foolish and vain, rules do little to protect us from 
unbearable burdens.  
 Therefore, we must ask whether our conceptions of good moral life and of right acts 
constrain in any way the supererogatory claims of the Anthropocene upon us. For example: 
 1. If one is asked to take a drug that will adjust the human mind to act in accord with 
contemporary expectations of Anthropocene dis-anthropecentrization but that might have 
very serious side-effects, should she take it? 
 2. If one knows that a more efficient life-form (such as fungi) can colonize humans so 




 3. If one knows that by eating the minimal survivable diet and by living without 
power or other ecocidal conveniences she will improve the lives of our descendants, should 
she live in this way? 
 4. If one knows that a particular variety of suicide will improve life for a successor 
intelligent species in Earth that is soon to appear, should she commit suicide? 
 5. If Anthropocene dis-anthropecentrization requires that we not reproduce, should 
we cease to reproduce? 
 6. If thorough-going dis-anthropecentrization convincingly and empirically entails 
that we must not use technology that clearly benefits humans and that cannot be replaced, 
should we cease to use it? 
 7. If thorough-going dis-anthropecentrization convincingly and empirically argues 
that humankind cease to use certain raw materials from Earth or from other planets for our 
well-being, should we cease to find or to use such materials? 
 8. If thorough-going dis-anthropecentrization convincingly and empirically shows 
that caring for human survival creates conditions that degrade the survival of other current 
species, or species yet to come, or artificial intelligences, or advanced aliens, should we cease 
to care for human survival? 
 9. Do the moral claims of successor species counsel us to forego grief or alarm at the 
demise of humankind? 
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 10. What moral claims does machinic intelligence have on us today? 
These questions illustrate what I mean when I ask whether the Anthropocene requires us to 
be saints. 
 This problem will remind some of you of the distinction between deep ecology and 
shallow ecology. Or it will bring to mind the ideas of Pentti Linkola, who said, “If there were 
a button I could press, I would sacrifice myself without hesitating, if it meant millions of 
people would die.”2 I find that Zoltan Báldiszár Simon’s distinction between “critical 
posthumanism” and “technological posthumanism” is useful here. The former seeks a just 
balance between humankind and the nonhuman. On the other hand, 
Technological posthumanism is not concerned with describing already existing non-
human inhabitants of the planet as fellows to humans. Instead, it invests in the 
prospect of bringing about not-yet-existing non-human beings in various ways, from 
enhanced beings escaping human confines to the expected creation of greater-than-
human machine intelligence. Put differently, technological posthumanism envisions 
the emergence of an era of posthumanity.3 
                                                 
2Dana Milbank, “A Strange Finnish Thinker Posits War, Famine as Ultimate 'Goods,” The Wall 
Street Journal Asia, 24 May 1994: 1 
3Zoltan Báldiszár Simon, “(The Impossibility of) Acting Upon a Story that We Can Believe,”  




Much of the best work on our “historical future” is today done by philosophers of history. 
Simon is a leader in this, and although I very much disagree with him I commend his 
writings to your attention. 
 Simon also challenges the favorable reception that the Anthropocene has received in 
the humanities. He thinks it is too easy, and in this I agree with him. This is at least in part a 
case of glamor overriding full awareness of the moral claims that a glamorous idea entails. As 
with the love of  “vibrant matter” and neo-materialisms, the academic humanities must 
continue to think in chief about how to judge these claims. Consider these words of Pentti 
Linkola, whom I mentioned a moment ago: 
What to do, when a ship carrying a hundred passengers suddenly capsizes and only 
one lifeboat? When the lifeboat is full, those who hate life will try to load it with 
more people and sink the lot. Those who love and respect life will take the ship’s axe 
and sever the extra hands that cling to the sides of the boat.4 
I contend that Linkola’s line of thought was the most rebarbative version of deep ecology. He 
thought it through all the way to the end of the line.  
 You can find ways to beat back his awful extremism, but you must undertake this task 
                                                 
4Pentti Linkola, “The Doctrine Of Survival And Doctor Ethics,” chapter VI of The Woreld and 





by fully using all the theoretical tools. These are, broadly, in my view, of two sorts. First: the 
concepts and methods of normative ethics, for one of the whole points of philosophical 
thought is to think an idea out to all the corners, the very dark corners, to which mere a 
priori thought leads. And the second comes straight out of the first: it is politics and the rest 
of moral philosophy. For it is real human well-being, happiness, and joy, or suffering and 
sadness that are at stake here. As many scientists have acknowledged, the Anthropocene and 
dis-anthropocentrization are political ideas and rhetorical concepts to a far greater degree, 
and require struggles of those kids, than the enjoyment of fresh critical perspectives by 
academics leads us to realize. 
 The response I expect to come rapidly is that we must view dis-anthropocentrization 
by taking up the perspective of Speculative Realism and particular that of Object-Oriented 
Ontology. Now, for reasons too intricate in detail here, I reject much of all New Realisms and 
neo-materialisms because of problems in their clotted logic and metaphysics, and I  
thoroughly reject Speculative Realism and particularly Object-Oriented Ontology because of 
these issues and because of their hopeless conceptions of historicity and sociality and because 
of the bad politics following therefrom—problems that not all New Realisms fully share. The 
point for present concerns is that if you expect object-oriented ontology to guide you 
through the kind of moral quandary I have raised, it will not do. Instead, you must use it to 
squash the moral dilemmas in order to establish the ontology you want. But Object-Oriented 
Ontology and related thought will not counsel you in moral matters after it has been 
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established because it has already decided them. It can be established solely upon its 
defenders’ preferred conclusions or deflections as to most of these issues, because it 
evacuated the issues. Moral life comes before ontology—this is my view because it is true—
and this a good example. 
 In order actually to consider the kinds of question that this problematic generates, 
here are several considerations from within the constitution of moral experience that will 
bear on proper phenomenological and existential deliberation in this field. 
 1. How do we manage our self-destructiveness that de-centering humankind might 
provoke? 
 2. What right actions might the limits of human consciousness interdict? 
 3. As against the impartialist normativity of rigid anti-anthropocentrism, how do we 
theorize the local loyalties and projects that deeply characterize human sociality? 
 4. What use are imperfect rights of non-humans that are counterpart to the perfect 
duties attending self-preservation of our species? 
 5. How do we understand relationality in the Anthropocene? 
 6. What are the elements of a constructive concept of a good community, or polity, 
that includes humans and nonhumans? 
 7. What political projects concerning justice press us? What can improved democracy 
contribute or not contribute? 
 In the case of the Anthropocene we see a powerful interconnection between 
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understanding history and knowing the right things to do. In the case of dis-
anthropocentrization, the basis of the historical-temporal mode of human existence—the key 
discovery of modernity, of which the phenomenology of Dasein is an exemplary but by no 
means the only component—is challenged in so far as it is a presentation of more traditional 
humanism. What was revolutionary in modernity thus now blurs into a process from the 
past it presumed to reject. One can with good reason contend that this is true of every 
revolution at least from early modernity to the present. So the final question with which I 
shall leave you is: 
 Will the outcome if what at this point appear to be the “unprecedented challenges” of 
our relation to the natural world require us to dispose of the human model of personhood —
descending from Protagoras’ statement of the human measure—in favor of sacrificing 
humankind, or will we be able to improve the human lot from its present awful state, or will 
the future turn out to be, as it so often does, pretty much the same mixture of good and bad, 
of justice and injustice, of blessings and of misery, as the past has been? 
